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PURSUING THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF HOMELESS
CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW FOR ADVOCATES
EvAN S. STOLOVE*
INTRODUCTION
Education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education in our dem-
ocratic society .... [Education] is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awak-
ening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an adequate education.'
Although generally highly valued in our society, education has yet
to receive the attention it deserves. Courts and legislatures continue
to neglect their duty to see that all children receive an education-
particularly homeless children. The educational system is of particu-
lar value to homeless children because of its ability to add "a much-
needed sense of place and continuity that they otherwise lack in their
fragmented lives."2 According to any estimate, however, the number
of homeless school-age children who do not attend school is stagger-
ing.' As a result, society is creating a large number of disenfranchised
youth.4 If we continue to fail to provide for these children, "[they] will
* A.B., University of Michigan, 1990; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law,
1994. The author wishes to acknowledge the patience and support of Professor Stanley S.
Herr and Delegate Samuel "Sandy" I. Rosenberg, whose Homelessness Law Seminar made
this paper possible.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, BROKEN LrVES: DENIAL OF EDUCATION TO
HOMELESS CHILDREN I (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter NATIONAL COALITION].
A life of homelessness and poverty is devastating for a child. The stigma of being
a social outcast erodes a child's sense of self-worth. For a homeless child, educa-
tion offers probably the only road out of his seemingly hopeless situation. It of-
fers contact with a stable, sheltered world; it provides examples of strength and
courage; it teaches self-worth and initiative. And it provides badly needed skills.
Id. at 21.
3. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
4. See Stanley S. Herr, Children Without Homes: Rights to Education and to Family Stability,
45 U. MtAMI L. REv. 337, 339-42 (1990-91).
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become the next generation of dispossessed, uneducated, angry
Americans."5
This Comment explores why homeless children are being denied
admittance to public schools and the effect that denial is having on
them.6 Part I of this Comment addresses the barriers that keep home-
less children out of school, and the toll that being denied admission
takes on their health and psychological and intellectual growth. Part
II surveys current legislation and litigation efforts and other tactics
attorneys have employed in battling this problem. Part III explores
approaches to the issue beyond common legal parameters and offers
suggestions and new strategies for advocates.
I. THE PROBLEM
As of 1990, estimates of the number of homeless children in the
United States ranged between 280,871 and 750,000. 7 During the
1992-93 school year, there were 4566 homeless children in the state of
Maryland alone.' Moreover, Travelers Aid International and the
Child Welfare League reported in 1987 that only forty-three percent
of homeless children nationwide regularly attended school.9 In Mary-
land, 1240 out of the 6440 homeless children between the ages of zero
and eighteen in 1989 did not attend school."
5. NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2, at 21.
6. Where possible, this Comment will focus specifically on the condition of homeless
children in Maryland. Unfortunately, at the time this Comment was written, the most re-
cent information the Acting Coordinator of Maryland's Office of Education of Homeless
Children and Youth could provide was for the 1989-90 school year.
7. Herr, supra note 4, at 340; see also NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2, at 1 (estimat-
ing the number of homeless children to be 500,000).
8. MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMEN-r OF EDUCATION, THE FACT BOOK 1993-1994: A STATIS-
TICAL HANDBOOK 35 (1994). Of those children, 2634 were between the ages of 6 and 16.
Id.
9. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 441, 472; see alsoJonathan Kozol, A Reporter at Large, The Homeless and Their
Children, NEW YORKER (Jan. 25, 1988), at 65, 80 (asserting that the "transient existence [of
homeless children] cuts them from the rolls").
10. SHELLEY JACKSON, STATE PLANS FOR THE EDUCATION OF HOMELESS CHILDREN AND
YOUTH: A SELECTED SURVEY OF THIRTY-FIvE STATES 74 (June 1990); see also Dale Mezza-
cappa, Learning in a State of Chaos, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 1989, at IA, 8A (reporting that
more than 30% of the homeless children in Philadelphia are absent from school on any
given day); Sebastian Rotella, School for Homeless Children Opens at N. Hollywood Shelter, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at BI ("School district surveys last year found 828 homeless children
enrolled and estimated that at least another 2300 were not enrolled, figures that officials
say are clearly low because 268 of the 650 schools surveyed could not identify homeless
students.").
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A. The Barriers
Many factors account for the absence of homeless children in our
schools; the most common include transportation, social, legal, finan-
cial, bureaucratic, and familial barriers."
1. Transportation Barriers.-Transportation is a problem for
homeless children because the shelters in which they reside often are
far from the schools that they are supposed to attend. Generally,
homeless children are required to attend a school in the same district
in which they lived prior to becoming homeless."2 Homeless families
move frequently and sometimes far away from their former homes;
thus, getting the children to school often can prove difficult. 3 More-
over, even when not required to attend a school close to their previ-
ous home, children often are assigned to schools outside the region in
which their shelter is located because the local school is "full."' 4 As a
result, some walk as far as two miles to school,' 5 while others are bused
to schools more than forty miles away,' 6 or receive no transportation
to schools that are not within walking distance of their shelter.'7
The situation in Maryland is indicative of the problem as a whole.
Most of the homeless youth in Maryland attend schools in the district
of their shelter,'" but in some counties it takes an average of seven
days to schedule transportation.19 Since the average stay in emer-
gency shelters is thirty to forty days, many children attend five to six
different schools a year with many periods of no schooling in be-
11. L. JUANE HEFLIN & KATHRYN RUDY, HOMELESS AND IN NEED OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
17-20 (1991); see also Herr, supra note 4, at 348 (listing other categories).
12. See Tracie Reddick, Homeless Children Get Help Clearing Hurdles to School, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at B3. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages attendant
to continuing attendance at the school of origin, see Yvonne Rafferty, Developmental and
Educational Consequences of Homelesssess on Children and Youth, in HOMELESS CHILDREN AND
YOUTH: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 105, 120-21 (Kryder-Coe et al. eds., 1991).
13. See Reddick, supra note 12, at B3 ("[Liaws that limit the amount of days a family can
stay at a shelter make it difficult for children to stay in school.").
14. NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2, at 9-10.
15. Jonetta R. Barras, Senate Told Homeless Kids Fight Barriers to Stay in School, WASH.
TIMES, May 23, 1990, at Bi.
16. Kozol, supra note 9, at 81. Some children have to leave their shelters so early in the
morning that they do not get to eat breakfast, and many arrive at school late. Id.
17. See NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2, at 9.
18. MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EDUCATING HOMELESS CHILDREN &
YOUTH: How ARE WE MEASURING Up? 7 (1990) (reporting on progress made in the 1989-
90 school year) [hereinafter How ARE WE MEASURING UP?].
19. Id.
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tween.2° Simple math indicates that some of these children are miss-
ing up to forty-two days of school a year-almost a month and a half.
2. Social Barriers. -Homeless children often resist attending
school regularly because of their frequent exclusion from social inter-
action with other students. As one commentator has noted,
Children who are ashamed of being homeless often resist go-
ing to school, afraid that they are marked by their dirty
clothes, their mode of transportation, their lack of supplies,
their inability to invite friends home after school, or simply
afraid that teachers and the other children know they are
homeless. Unfortunately, in many schools other students do
tease and taunt homeless children. Teachers sometimes un-
wittingly make it worse by singling out homeless children for
special attention.2 1
The ridicule and harassment can reach dangerous levels. In one dis-
trict in California, for example, two five year-olds suffered nervous
breakdowns caused by harassment.22
3. Legal Barriers.-Legal barriers associated with residency re-
quirements and guardianship arrangements often preclude homeless
children from attending school. For example, districts in which shel-
ters are located sometimes use residency requirements to keep "unde-
sirable" homeless children out by labelling homeless families
nonresidents.23 In fact, when districts disagree over how residency is
determined, homeless children may be left in a legal limbo in which
they are not considered residents anywhere. 24 Even when children
are admitted to school in a particular district, the length of their resi-
dency in the district is often limited by municipal ordinances that
limit homeless family stays in shelters to a fixed number of days.25
20. See id.
21. Lisa K. Mihaly, Homeless Families: Failed Policies and Young Victims, CDF's CHILD,
YouTm, AMD FAMILY Fu-ruRss CLEARINGHOUSE, Jan. 1991, at 1, 8.
22. Christopher Pummer, School System Still Leaves Many Homeless Children Out in the
Cold, L.A. TIMES (Ventura County Ed.), Dec. 2, 1991, at BI; see also Lynda Richardson, Walls
of Shame Keep Homeless from School, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 2, 1992, at Al (reporting that a sixth-
grade math teacher of a homeless boy "stood at the front of the class and told everyone
who mattered in his adolescent world: 'I didn't know we had a shelter kid in here; give a
hand for the shelter kid'").
23. NATIONAL COALmON, supra note 2, at 5.
24. Id. at 7; see Orozco v. Sobol, 674 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (addressing a denial
of admission to the schools in the districts of both the former residence and current resi-
dence), dismissed in part, 703 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
25. NATIONAL COALrION, supra note 2, at 6.
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Other schools simply claim that they are unable to accommodate the
children because they lack the space.26
Guardianship arrangements also may prevent homeless children
from attending school. Homeless parents may leave their children
with another family or relatives in an attempt to provide their children
with a more stable living situation.27 Such guardianship arrange-
ments, however, may decrease the children's school attendance. If
the person with whom the children are living is not made a legal
guardian, the children may be unable to register for school.2" In addi-
tion, schools may refuse to allow a child to return to school after a
suspension or absence unless the signature of a legal guardian or par-
ent can be obtained.29
4. Financial Barriers.-For homeless families, the basic require-
ments of food and shelter come first.3 ° As a result, these families may
not have enough money for school clothes or school supplies.31
While some communities are willing to help through clothing banks,
others are not so generous.32 Consequently, the homeless are some-
times too ashamed to subject themselves to scrutiny at school.3
5. Bureaucratic Barriers. -- Schools often deny admittance to
homeless children because they lack immunization records, reports
from a previous school, and other miscellaneous records.34 Requiring
these documents often causes lengthy delays during which the child is
unable to attend school.3" Even when the records have not been de-
stroyed or lost, obtaining them and the necessary immunizations can
be a "logistical nightmare" with which many homeless parents are ill-
prepared to deal.36
Bureaucratic barriers may also cause de facto denials of admit-
tance. For example, by the time a student is appropriately assessed
26. Id. at 8.
27. See id. at 13-14.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id.
30. HErLIN & RUDY, supra note 11, at 18.
31. Id.
32. See Mezzacappa, supra note 10, at 8A (discussing the efforts of Philadelphia princi-
pals and school teachers to provide clothes).
33. See Reddick, supra note 12, at B3 (reporting the efforts of one school to provide a
child with new shoes because the ones he wore identified him as poor and caused ridicule
by his peers).
34. NATIONAL COALTION, supra note 2, at 10-11.
35. See Barras, supra note 15, at B1 (noting one student's loss of a month of schooling).
36. NATIONAL COALrIION, supra note 2, at 11.
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and placed in a special education program,"' the child may have
moved into another school district."8 Other schools delay beginning
placement testing because homeless children move so often.3 9 As a
result, children in need of special education often are placed in a reg-
ular classroom in which they gain little benefit during the short time
they attend the school. Many also exhibit behavioral problems as a
result of improper placement, which, in turn, may result in
expulsion.4 °
6. Familial Barriers.-Parents often believe their homeless condi-
tion is so temporary that they do not need to enroll their children in a
new school.4' Others fail to enroll their children in school "to spare
[them] yet another temporary environment."42
More fundamentally, most homeless parents are preoccupied
with the struggle to earn wages and ensure the family's day-to-day sur-
vival.41 Consequently, school is less of a priority. For example, par-
ents often need their school-age children to stay out of school to baby-
sit younger children while the parents look for work, food, and
shelter.44
Other "familial" concerns of the homeless are based on fear.
Children often fear leaving their shelter because they believe their be-
longings will be stolen while they are gone,45 and parents sometimes
keep children out of school for fear of harm by abusive partners
whom they are fleeing. 46 Other parents are simply afraid of the neigh-
borhood in which they live and do not wish to subject their children
to the dangers of the streets.
47
B. The Effects of Homelessness
Sixty-five percent of homeless children suffer from one or more
acute or chronic health problem.4" They have two times the normal
rate of chronic disease and are three times more likely to have an
elevated blood-lead level in comparison to other children of low socio-
37. See HEFLIN & RUDY, supra note 11, at 18-19.
38. Mezzacappa, supra note 10, at 8A NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2, at 12.
39. NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2, at 12-13.
40. Id. at 13.
41, How ARE WE MEASURING UP?, supra note 18, at 7.
42. Mihaly, supra note 21, at 8.
43. HEFLIN & RUDY, supra note 11, at 20.
44. Mihaly, supra note 21, at 8.
45. Mezzacappa, supra note 10, at 8A.
46. Mihaly, supra note 21, at 8.
47. Mezzacappa, supra note 10, at 8A.
48. Id.
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economic status.49 In addition, homeless children often suffer from
poor nutrition" and fail to seek health services until a medical condi-
tion becomes very severe.5" Even when they receive medical atten-
tion, they are often incapable of following the medical regimen
prescribed and remain in poor health.5 2 Consequently, their per-
formance and attendance in school suffers.53
Even for homeless children who are fortunate enough to make it
to school, learning is often more difficult for them than other chil-
dren. Many suffer from developmental delays as a result of inade-
quate or no prenatal and postnatal care. 4 Living in a shelter and
sharing small quarters with an entire family also makes it difficult to
study and keep up in school.55 Like all children, homeless children
"need stability, support from their peers . . . and help from undis-
tracted parents" to succeed in school. 56 Because they frequently lack
these advantages, they often suffer from stress, poor self-esteem, and
depression.
7
The research of Ellen Bassuk and Lenore Rubin has graphically
demonstrated the damaging effects of homelessness on the develop-
ing minds of school-age youth.5 ' Of the children in their study who
49. HEFUN & RUDY, supra note 11, at 9 ("[N] either demographics nor substance abuse
are the major factors leading to chronic illness. The major factor is homelessness itself.").
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. KathleenJ. Moroz & Elizabeth A. Segal, Homeless Children: Intervention Strategies for
School Social Workers, 12 Soc. WoRK EDUC. 134, 137 (1990).
54. HEFLrN & RUDy, supra note 11, at 10; see also Ellen L. Bassuk & Lynn Rosenberg,
Psychosocial Characteristics of Homeless Children and Children with Homes, 85 PEDIATRICS 257,
260 (1990) (noting that homelessness has a greater effect on preschoolers). Studies indi-
cate that homeless preschoolers have significantly more developmental delays than their
domiciled peers. See Leslie Rescorla et al., Ability, Achievement, and Adjustment in Homeless
Children, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 210, 218 (1991); Bassuk & Rosenberg, supra, at 266.
They also suffer from "significantly higher rates of behavioral/emotional symptoms."
Rescorla et al., supra, at 218. Possible reasons for the differences between the preschoolers,
and those in school are: (1) preschoolers' homeless experiences have been a larger pro-
portion of their total lives, id.; (2) children in school are "exposed in some degree to
educational stimulation, expectations of socialization, [and] a stable and predictable rou-
tine," while "[t] he homeless preschoolers [are] spending their days in [an] unstructured and
chaotic environment. . . , often in the presence of adults who [are] feeling highly stressed
and overwhelmed," id. at 219; and (3) preschoolers' personalities are still developing, so
they are more likely to be influenced by their environment. Id.
55. Moroz & Segal, supra note 53, at 137.
56. Mihaly, supra note 21, at 7.
57. HEFUN & RUDY, supra note 11, at 9-10.
58. See Ellen Bassuk & Lenore Rubin, Homeless Children: A Neglected Population, 57 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHATRY 279 (1987). Bassuk and Rubin studied 156 children in 14 Massachusetts
family shelters. In addition to their conclusions regarding school-age children, their re-
search revealed that, among children five years of age and younger, 47% exhibited at least
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were over five years old, a majority expressed suicidal thoughts,5 9
forty-three percent were failing or doing below-average work, and
twenty-five percent were in special classes.60 A significant portion of
the parents were aware of their children's problems, but "preoccupied
with concerns about survival"; they had "little energy for anything else.
Overwhelmed, parents cannot act as successful advocates for their
children."61
II. EXISTING REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ADVOCATES FOR HOMELESS
CHILDREN
Attending school can offer homeless children a sense of stability,
continuity, hope, and support. Obviously, school is not a complete
solution to the problems plaguing homeless children because "with-
out the stability of a permanent home, any meaningful education is
extremely difficult." 2 Nevertheless, as one commentator noted,
"there is no institution better situated to impact upon the cycle of
homelessness than the school."6" Thus, advocates must not abandon
their efforts to see that homeless children are educated. This section
examines existing legislation, currently viable legal theories, and
other possible approaches for ensuring that homeless children are al-
lowed to attend school.
A. Federal Statutes
1. The McKinney Act.-In 1987 Congress enacted the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act," the first federal legislation to
address the problems facing homeless people in America. Title VII,
subtitle B of the Act deals specifically with education.65 It was
amended in 1990 to address more effectively the problem of homeless
children not attending school.66 For states who choose to seek federal
one developmental delay in either language, personal/social development, gross motor
skills, or fine motor coordination. Id. at 281.
59. Id, at 282. The majority of the children in their study were found to be suffering
from "severe anxiety and depression," and approximately one-half were in need of psychi-
atric referral and evaluation. Id. at 284.
60. Id. at 283.
61. Id. at 285.
62. NATIONAL COALrION, supra note 2, at 2.
63. Camilla M. Cochrane, Comment, The Homeless School-Age Child: Can Educational
Rights Meet Educational Needs., 45 U. Mi~mi L. RExv. 537, 537-38 (1990-91) (footnote
omitted).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (amended 1990).
65. See id. §§ 11431-11435.
66. See H.R. R:P'. No. 583(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6398, 6417 ("Three years after the enactment of this program, national re-
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grants pursuant to the Act, it requires creation of plans to increase the
school attendance levels of homeless children67 and prohibits the use
of homelessness as a basis for denial of admission.68 The Act also
mandates that the states remove barriers to school attendance such as
residency and records requirements. 69
The McKinney Act, however, is far from a panacea for homeless
children.7 ° It does not specifically address the need for supplemental
services such as transportation and counseling, nor does it provide
parents with procedural safeguards to protect their children from ar-
bitrary expulsions or denials of admission.71 Furthermore, Congress
has failed to appropriate sufficient funding to implement the Act,72
and there are no sanctions for noncompliance. 73
2. The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act.-The Runaway and
Homeless Youth Act74 provides grants for the establishment and oper-
ation of centers to meet the immediate needs of homeless youth and
their families.75 Recognizing that keeping children in elementary and
secondary schools may help prevent juvenile delinquency, Congress
ports estimate [d] that a significant number of homeless school-aged children are not at-
tending school regularly.").
The McKinney Act originally required States to remove residency-related pol-
icies which were keeping homeless children out of school .... The Committee
bill directs States to address remaining barriers, specifically including residency
requirements, problems with school and immunization record transfer, transpor-
tation, and guardianship requirements and demonstrate that the State and local
educational agencies have developed and will implement and enforce policies to
remove barriers to the enrollment and retention of homeless children and home-
less youth.
Id. at 6417-18.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e).
68. Id. § 11431(1) & (3).
69. Id. § 11431(2); see supra notes 11-47 and accompanying text (discussing the
barriers).
70. See generally JACKSON, supra note 10, at 33-34 & n.75 (making suggestions for im-
provement). Among Jackson's suggestions include: (1) more broadly defining "home-
less"; (2) requiring greater accountability at both local and state levels; (3) allowing
parents to make school choice decisions; (4) ensuring that dispute resolution mechanisms
are informal so that a lawyer is not required and definitive time limits are established; (5)
placing responsibility on local educational agencies for obtaining records, providing neces-
sary vaccinations, and tracking students; (6) making definitive statements regarding trans-
portation, and (7) requiring more substantial involvement in monitoring and
implementation of state plans by the U.S. Department of Education. Id.
71. Herr, supra note 4, at 351.
72. Andrew S. Hughes, Comment, Education Lost: The Homeless Children's Right to Educa-
tion, 30 SANTA CLkRA L. Rv. 829, 833 (1990).
73. Cochrane, supra note 63, at 541.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5751 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (amended 1989).
75. Id. § 5711 (a).
1352 [VOL. 53:1344
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passed the Act primarily to supplement the Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act of 1974.76 Congress also found that there is a
strong correlation between the living conditions common to homeless
children-such as poverty, illiteracy, and poor medical and mental
health resources-and juvenile delinquency. 77 Advocates for the
homeless should consider using this legislation to fund programs to
combat the common problems of juvenile delinquency and homeless
youth.
3. Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act.-The Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) 78 requires states to provide
children who meet the statutory definition of an "individual with disa-
bilities,"79 including homeless children who meet the definition, a
free appropriate public education."0 It also provides parents of dis-
abled children a private right of action to challenge decisions of the
state educational agency regarding the educational needs of their chil-
dren."' This Act is of vital importance to advocates for homeless chil-
dren because estimates indicate that the percentage of homeless
children who qualify for services under the IDEA is higher than that
for the population of children as a whole.82 As a result of homeless-
ness, "a high proportion of.. . children suffer severe anxiety, depres-
sion, emotional trauma, and developmental delays."8 3 Handicapped
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601 (a) (3)-5780 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (amended 1990). This Act
was created for the purpose of preventing juvenile delinquency. S. REP. No. 93-1011, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283.
77. S. REP. No. 93-1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5283.
78. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
79. Section 1401 (a) (1) (A) states:
The term "children with disabilities" means children-(i) with mental retarda-
tion, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments,
visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthope-
"dic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.
Section 1401 (a) (1) (B) states:
The term "children with disabilities" for children aged three to five, inclusive,
may, at a State's discretion, include children-
(i) experiencing developmental delays, as defined by the State and as mea-
sured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and procedures, in one or more of
the following areas: physical development, cognitive development, communica-
tion development, social or emotional development, or adaptive development
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (B).
81. Id. § 1415(e).
82. Cochrane, supra note 63, at 558.
83. Herr, supra note 4, at 353; see also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
homeless children who encounter barriers to education therefore are
entitled to the rights and corresponding administrative and judicial
reviews available under the IDEA.14
B. Maryland Law
Maryland's founders believed that education should be at the
forefront of the state's concerns and embodied the belief in the state
constitution.8" As a result, Maryland has a system of free public
schools throughout the state.8" Proof of the state's commitment to
education is demonstrated by the free and reduced-price breakfast
and lunch programs the schools administer.87
In accordance with the McKinney Act, 8 Maryland adopted a plan
to address homelessness and education. In determining whether a
child will attend school in his original district or district of current
residence, Maryland chose a progressive approach.8 9 Local education
officials are required to consider the views of the child's parents in
making their determination. 0 The plan fails to provide guidance,
however, as to whether the local agency of the child's residence, or of
the child's origin, should make this determination. 9'
Under the plan, placement disputes are brought to local officials
and then, if unresolved, to state officials.9" The plan does not, how-
ever, indicate which school a child should attend prior to the resolu-
tion of a dispute; it indicates only that local education agencies should
review dispute procedures to ensure that the child's schooling is not
disrupted.9"
Whatever its faults, Maryland's plan is promising, primarily be-
cause it recommends that homeless students be enrolled regardless of
84. See 20 U.S.C § 1415(b) (authorizing parents to review records and obtain an in-
dependent educational evaluation of the child). These remedies can also be pursued
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (amended
1992), which prohibits any program receiving governmental assistance from discriminating
on the basis of a disability. This Comment does not reach the issue of whether the Rehabil-
itation Act provides any additional relief other than that already available under the IDEA.
85. MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("The General Assembly, at its First Session after the adop-
tion of this Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and effi-
cient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation or otherwise, for their
maintenance.").
86. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 1-201 (1992).
87. Id. §§ 7-501, 7-503, 7-5A-01.
88. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
89. JACKSON, supra note 10, at 9-10.
90. Id at 10 & n.30.
91. Id. at 10 & n.29.
92. Id. at 12 & n.38.
93. Id. at 14.
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the availability of records and that local agencies refer and monitor
the immunization of unimmunized children.94 Moreover, Maryland
has implemented a tracking system for its homeless children that
should provide advocates with valuable information.
9 5
Other provisions of Maryland's legislative scheme provide advo-
cates with remedial measures of dubious value. First, sections 8-101 to
8-107 of the Education Article allow for the creation of compensatory
programs for children who qualify as a "disadvantaged child."9 6 The
definition of a "disadvantaged child" under the statute is broad
enough to include homeless children. Unfortunately, it applies only
to children who are already attending school, not those seeking ad-
mission.97 This statute nevertheless should be used to help equalize
the imbalance in the treatment of homeless children already attend-
ing school.
Another significantly less attractive approach is to argue that the
child is subject to "neglect."98 "Neglect" includes failure by a child's
94. Id. at 53. The plan, however, neglects to address important transportation issues.
Id. at 20 & n.15.
95. Id. at 17.
Participants in this system-shelter providers, social services workers and [local
education agencies]i-submit completed "tracking forms" about all homeless chil-
dren between birth and age eighteen, including the child's name, social security
number, age, sex, ethnic origin, school attended, grade and current housing ar-
rangements (including the date the child entered the shelter or motel) to the
[state educational agency] according to an established schedule .... The [state
educational agency] enters this information into a computerized data system each
month, and disseminates an interpretation of the data to local contacts twice each
year.
Id.
96. Id. §§ 8-101 to -107.
97. A "disadvantaged child" is a child who:
(1) Because of environmental conditions, is not achieving at a level that is
scholastically up to his potential abilities;
(2) Has to compensate for his inability to profit from the normal educational
program;
(3) Is 3 years old or older and under 19 and has not graduated from high
school;
(4) Has the potential to complete successfully a regular educational program
leading to graduation from a high school; and
(5) Because of home and community environment, is subject to ... eco-
nomic disadvantages that make his completion of the regular program leading to
graduation unlikely without special efforts by school authorities to provide stimu-
lation of his potential in addition to the efforts involved in providing the regular
educational programs.
Id. § 8-101(b).
98. SeeMD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 5-701(n)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993) (amended 1993).
"'Neglect' means the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and
attention to a child by the child's parents, guardian, or custodian under circumstances that
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parents to provide for their child's educational needs. 9 A finding of
"neglect" allows child protective services to intervene;100 they, how-
ever, may not intervene based on homelessness alone.101
C. Litigation Strategies
Just maybe the litigation process, done intelligently and
done well, aside from winning an injunction here and there,
can also help create the clarity of solutions that we need to
get past some of these particularly awful public scandals.102
The litigation process is another avenue available to advocates in-
terested in protecting the right of homeless children to attend school.
Claims based on the right to due process, equal protection, or provi-
sions of the McKinney Act each may succeed in the courts.
1. The Due Process Argument.--Entitlement to a public education
is a property interest.10 3 Once a state has granted a child the right to
an education, it cannot deny that right without due process of the
law.10 4 How much process is due is a question of federal constitu-
tional law.10 5
indicate that the child's health or welfare is significantly harmed or placed at risk of signifi-
cant harm." Id.
99. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07 § 02.07.02B(4), (16) (1993) (defining "proper care and
attention," as used in § 5-701(n) (1), to include providing for the child's educational
needs).
100. Carol W. Williams, Child Welfare Services and Homelessness: Issues in Policy, Philosophy,
and Programs, in HOMELESS CHILDREN AND YOUTH: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 285, 290
(Kryder-Coe et al. eds., 1991).
After a period of homelessness, the children frequently experience medical ne-
glect, educational neglect, and/or a lack of supervision while parents look for
work and housing. Given this, child protective services often intervene in situa-
tions of homelessness with a more intrusive intervention than would be required
if families had access to appropriate housing resources.
Id.
101. Id. at 289 (citation omitted). "Homelessness in the absence of a parental act of
omission or commission that places the child in serious jeopardy would not warrant the
intervention of child protective services." Id.
102. Robert M. Hayes, Homelessness & the Legal Profession, 35 Loy. L. REv. 1, 9 (1989).
103. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1974); 419 U.S. at 574; Thomas v. Allegany
County Bd. of Educ., 51 Md. App. 312, 320, 443 A.2d 622, 627 (1982); accord Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981); Wolfe v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 575
F. Supp. 346, 351 (D.N.M. 1982) (mem.); Smith v. Dallas County Bd. of Educ., 480 F. Supp.
1324, 1338 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
104. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572-74; Takeall ex rel. Rubinstein v. Ambach, 609 F. Supp. 81,
85 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
105. See Harrison v. Sobol, 705 F. Supp. 870, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The length of the
deprivation does not determine whether process is due. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 575-76
("'[IM ook not to the "weight" but to the nature of the interest at stake.'") (quoting Board of
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York addressed a relevant due process argument in Takeall ex reL Ru-
binstein v. Ambach.1 ° 6 In Takeall, an eighteen-year-old male com-
plained of being denied admission to school.10 7 He was given oral
notification, but no written notice of the denial and no notice of any
hearing or other chance for review.1° Using the test developed in
Matthews v. Eldridge,1° the court found that the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation was much greater than the minor administrative burden in-
volved in supplying written notice."1 ' To meet due process standards,
the court ruled, the school must notify students and their families of
any decision to deny admission, a list of reasons for the denial, and
any available administrative remedies.'
A homeless child denied admission to school is entitled, at a min-
imum, to the procedures articulated by the court in Takeall. It is well
documented, as discussed earlier in this Comment, the effect that
deprivation of a school atmosphere has on a homeless child. As one
court characterized it, denying a homeless child admission to school
could result in "irreparable harm" in relation to the child's educa-
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)). Rather, the length and severity only go to
the type of process due. Id, at 576. "A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in
our view and may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause." Id.
Some states also have due process clauses in their constitutions. See, e.g., MD. CONST.
DECL. OF Rrs. art. 24 ("That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land."). States are free to grant more due process under their state constitutions than the
federal constitution affords.
The Maryland Court of Appeals consistently has treated Article 24 similarly to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Northhampton Corp. v. Washington
Suburban Sanitation Comm'n, 278 Md. 677, 686, 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976) ("same mean-
ing and effect"); Aero Motors v. Administrator, 274 Md. 567, 587, 337 A.2d 685, 699 (1975)
("equal" but not "synonymous"); Rafferty v. Comptroller of Treasury, 228 Md. 153. 161.
178 A.2d 896, 900 (1962) ("This Court has said in construing Article [24] that the Supreme
Court cases construing the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are practi-
cally direct authorities.'") (quoting Home Util. Co. v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 209 Md.
610, 122 A.2d 109 (1956)).
106. 609 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
107. Id. at 83.
108. Id.
109. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975). Under Matthews, the strength of the private interest, "the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards [are weighed
against] the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would en-
tail." Id.
110. Taheall 609 F. Supp. at 85.
111. Id. at 87.
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tional, social, and psychological development. 112 The harm, there-
fore, to the child will undoubtedly warrant significant predeprivation
procedural safeguards.
2. The Equal Protection Argument.-To date the Supreme Court
has refused to find the right to education a fundamental constitu-
tional right."1 In its decision in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez," 4 however, the Court, in dicta,' 15 unknowingly indicated
its support of the "Total Deprivation Theory."" 6 This theory suggests
that if a child is being totally deprived of an education, an equal pro-
tection argument may win him admission.
This theory gained further support in the Court's opinion in Plyer
v. Doe,'" 7 in which Justice Brennan declared that education is not
merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from
other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the impor-
tance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child,
mark the distinction .... [It] provides the basic tools by
112. Orozcov v. Sobol, 674 F. Supp. 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), dismissed in part, 703 F.
Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
113. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). The Court stated
that "the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 30. In determining whether education is a fundamental right, the Court
insisted that, "the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. at 33-34. The Court found no such guaran-
tee. Id. at 35.
114. 411 U.S. at 1.
115. The Court began with the following phrase: "Whatever merit appellees' argument
might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational op-
portunities to any of its children .... " Id. at 37.
116. See David Woodward, Homelessness: A Legal Activist Analysis ofJudicial and Street Strate-
gies, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 251, 255 (1986) (exploring the Total Deprivation The-
ory's applicability to the right to shelter litigation). Woodward believes that the Court has
lent support to the theory in connection with the deprivation of many rights affecting
homeless people. See id. at 260-69 (exploring criminal, voting, residency, access to courts,
and public benefits law). While he considers the Court's support of the theory a first step
toward reaching justice for the homeless, he recognizes that it is inadequate by itself, and
he explores various other current statutory provisions to provide "side doors." See id. at
269-87 (considering mental health, welfare, and state sex discrimination law). Further-
more, Woodward explored nonjudicial "street strategies." See id. at 287-97; see also infra
notes 180-182, 185-188 and accompanying text. He measured the merits of each strategy,
and ultimately found that the Total Deprivation Theory is best saved for some future time
when the make-up of the Court has changed. Woodward, supra, at 299. He advocates
using the "side door" approaches in combination with aggressive street strategies. Id. at
306-07.
117. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause a
Texas statute that denied illegal alien children access to school).
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which individuals might lead economically productive lives
.... [E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society .... [D]enial of education to some iso-
lated group of children poses an affront to... the goals of
the Equal Protection Clause .... Paradoxically, by depriving
the children of any disfavored group of an education, we
foreclose the means by which that group might raise the
level of esteem in which it is held by the majority. 1 8
Even in Plyer, however, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny in re-
viewing the denial of admission in the case, thus again failing to ac-
cord education the status of a fundamental right." 9 Although it is
difficult to tell how wide the applicability of the Plyer holding is-espe-
cially in light of the caveats sounded by Justice Powell' 2 ° and Chief
Justice Burger' 2 '-it is clear that a total denial of education would
violate equal protection regardless of the class of citizens involved.'
Equal protection arguments may not be as effective, however, in
attacking the less severe educational barriers faced by homeless chil-
dren. Because education has not been deemed a fundamental right
and homeless children are unlikely to be considered a suspect class, 12 3
118. Id. at 221-22.
119. The Court instead applied an intermediate level of scrutiny. Id. at 224 ("In light of
[the costs to the nation and the innocent children, this law] can hardly be considered
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State."). For an excellent discussion
of the standards of review utilized by the Supreme Court in applying the Equal Protection
clause, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 602-08 (12th ed. 1992).
120. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 236 (Powell,J., concurring) (emphasizing "the unique charac-
ter of the cases").
121. See id. at 243 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's opinion.., will likely stand
for little beyond the results of these particular cases.").
122. Compare Herr, supra note 4, at 354 (" As... Plyer v. Doe made clear, equal protection
of the laws demands that no child be denied access to a state-created system of free, com-
pulsory education. If the children of illegal aliens can not [sic] be stripped of that right,
then surely the native-born children of homeless persons cannot forfeit their entitlement
to education.") (footnotes omitted) with Cochrane, supra note 63, at 560 (noting that equal
protection claims generally fail partly because the court refuses to find that education is a
fundamental right). But see Cochrane, supra note 63, at 560-61 ("Nonetheless, outright
exclusion of homeless children from state-funded educational opportunities by school dis-
tricts that continue to interpret state residency laws in a discriminatory manner may be
actionable under section 1983 as a violation of the equal protection clause.").
123. See Lampkin v. District of Columbia, No. 92-0910, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, at
*25 (D.D.C. Jun. 9, 1992) (mem.).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
courts probably would apply the weak rational basis test 124 to decide
cases involving other education-related rights.1
25
In light of the federal judiciary's lack of receptiveness to constitu-
tional claims, some advocates have turned to state constitutions.
26
Unfortunately for Maryland's homeless children advocates, Article 24
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights' 27 has been held to be in pari
materia to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.12' Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals has declined to recog-
nize education as a fundamental right as well. 129
124. See GUNTHER, supra note 119, at 602 (describing the court's historical application of
rational basis scrutiny). " [T]he courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and
purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required; judges allowed
legislators flexibility to act on the basis of broadly accurate generalizations and tolerated
considerable overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness in classification schemes." Id.
125. See Lampkin v. District of Columbia, No. 92-0910, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, at
*25 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992) (mem.) (evaluating an equal protection claim challenging the
provision of transportation for homeless children under the rational basis test). See also
infra note 148 (discussing the subsequent history of Lampkin).
126. See Michele Galen, An End Run Around the High Court, Bus. WK-, May 11, 1992, at 58-
62 (recognizing the shift in focus by civil rights groups towards state constitutions in light
of the "staunchly conservative U.S. Supreme Court"); see also Daan Braveman, Children,
Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577 (1989). Braveman suggests that litigators
turn to state courts and constitutions because the states are sovereign and capable of inter-
preting their constitutions more broadly, because (1) the text of state constitutions is dif-
ferent and therefore subject to different interpretation, id. at 594; (2) states traditionally
have demonstrated responsibility toward children, id.; (3) "[s]tate judges are under fewer
constraints than their federal counterparts," id.; (4) state judges work under a common law
tradition, and therefore are more free to consider arguments about social reality, public
policy, and fairness, id. at 611; and (5) state judges do not have federalism concerns. Id. at
612.
But see Sally S. Spector, Finding a Federal Forum: Using the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act to Circumvent Federal Abstention Doctrines, 6 LAW & INEQ. J. 273 (1988). Spector
argues that
[a] judicial forum is needed which not only can decide conclusively the Constitu-
tional issues presented by the homeless, but also can implement solutions to
those problems. The federal courts should be that forum. The federal judiciary
has demonstrated that it has the ability to grant relief which affects, and may even
restructure, state institutions so that the homeless could receive the full benefit of
state and federal laws.
Id. at 275.
127. MD. CONST. DECL. OF Ris. art. 24 ("That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned
or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any man-
ner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers,
or by the Law of the land.").
128. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 640, 458 A.2d 758, 781
(1983). The court noted, however, that "the two provisions are independent of each other
so that a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other." Id.
129. Id. at 650, 458 A.2d at 786.
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In Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education,'"° however, the
court implied that it would apply strict scrutiny to judge the validity of
a "significant deprivation" of educational rights."3 ' Under Hornbeck,
advocates in Maryland may be able to use the "significant deprivation"
language to expand the educational rights of homeless children. This
language lends itself to a theory with even broader applicability to ed-
ucation than the Total Deprivation Theory.3 2
3. The McKinney Act.-The McKinney Act is the most compre-
hensive and promising legislation to date for the homeless commu-
nity, 3' but it remains unclear whether a homeless person can bring
suit privately to enforce the Act when a state fails to comply with its
provisions.13 4
In Cort v. Ash,' 35 the Supreme Court laid out four factors to be
considered in determining whether a private cause of action should
be implied when Congress has included no determinative express pro-
vision in a statute: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class
for whom the act was enacted; (2) whether there exists any indication
that the legislature intended to create or deny such a remedy; (3)
whether it would be consistent with the purpose of the act to imply
the existence of such a remedy; and (4) whether "the cause of action
[is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law."' 3
The Ash Court added that as long as it is "clear" that the statute
gave "a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an
intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit pur-
130. Id. at 597, 458 A.2d at 758.
131. See id. at 653, 458 A.2d at 788. In Hornbeck, the plaintiffs challenged only the dis-
proportionate impact of the school financing system. Id. at 603, 458 A.2d at 761-62. The
court held that "the heightened review test [was] not applicable ... because there [had]
been no significant interference with, infringement upon, or deprivation of the underlying
right to take advantage of a thorough and efficient education...." Id. at 653, 458 A.2d at
788.
132. See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Act).
134. A court could either imply a private right of action or allow a private action to be
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
135. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Ash, a stockholder brought an action against a corporation
and its directors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. III 1991), a criminal statute.
Id. at 68. Section 610 included no express provision allowing a private right of action, and
the Court held that no right to a private remedy was implied within the statute. Id, at 77-
78.
136. Id.
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pose to deny such cause of action would be controlling."" 7 The Court
did not, however, give any indication as to how these factors should be
weighed in relation to one another.
The Court elaborated on the Ash factors four years later in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Reddington.'38 In Touche Ross, the Court stated that in the
past it found an implied right of action only when "the statute in ques-
tion at least prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in
favor of private parties." 139 Moreover, the Court explained, "[t] he ulti-
mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this
Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Con-
gress enacted into law." 4 ' Moreover, it is insufficient to find that a
right of action should exist simply because a provision of an Act was
intended to provide protection for a certain class of people."' Thus,
without some indication from the legislature that it envisioned a pri-
vate remedy, the Court is likely to refuse to find one.'42
At least one commentator believes that an implied private right of
action exists under the McKinney Act. 43 Applying the four part test
established in Ash, Andrew S. Hughes has asserted that (1) "[i] t is clear
from the McKinney Act and its legislative history that the statute was,
in part, designed to benefit homeless youth who are denied access to
137. Id. at 82.
138. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross, a customer of a security brokerage firm at-
tempted to sue an accounting firm that audited reports for a corporation pursuant to
§ 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, now amended and codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q(a) (1970). Id. at 562. The Act included no express provision allowing a private right
of action. Id at 569. The Court held that while § 17(a) provided early warning to inves-
tors, it did not provide any remedies. Id. at 570.
139. Id. at 569.
140. Id. at 578.
141. See id. ("Certainly, the mere fact that § 17(a) was designed to provide protection for
brokers' customers does not require the implication of a private damages action in their
behalf.").
142. See id. at 571 ("[Implying a private right of action on the basis of congressional
silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best."); cf. National Assoc. of Counties v. Baker, 842
F.2d 369, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that, in the absence of clear congressional intent,
no implied right of action will be found to enforce substantive rights under the Revenue
Sharing Act), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989); Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 201 (4th
Cir.) ("The regulation of access to the courts is largely a legislative task, and one that
courts should hesitate to undertake. For this reason, implied rights of action are disfa-
vored, and will not be found in the absence of clear evidence of legislative intent."), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 954 (1988).
For a thorough discussion of Touche Ross and Ash, see generally Charles C. Marvel,
Annotation, Implication of Private Right of Action from Provision of Federal Statute not Expressly
Providing for One-Supreme Court Cases, 61 L. Ed. 2d 910, 914-16 (1979).
143. Hughes, supra note 72, at 855; see also Herr, supra note 4, at 351 ("[Ilt arguably
creates a new federal right. .. ").
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public education";1 44 (2) since there are no express provisions for en-
forcement, and the Act speaks in mandatory language without excep-
tion, "Congress probably implied a private cause of action"; 4 ' (3)
such an action "is entirely consistent with and'helpful to the imple-
mentation of the legislative intent";1 46 and (4) while education is tra-
ditionally in the realm of the states, "the federal government has
always had the right to intervene." 47
Hughes, however, fails to consider the conservative approach the
Court adopted in Touche Ross. One would be hard pressed to find a
true hint by the legislature that it actually intended, as required by the
Touche Ross Court, to create a private right of action. Moreover, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently
found, in Lampkin v. District of Columbia,'48 that no implied private
right of action exists under the McKinney Act.1 49 Applying the Ash
Court's analysis, the Lamphin court found that Congress did not in-
tend to create an implied right of action, and that finding one would
be inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme.'
50
The Lampkin court also considered whether private citizens have
a right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bring suit under the McKinney
144. Hughes, supra note 72, at 853.
145. Id. at 854; cf Allen V. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969) (holding that
without the right to bring a private cause of action, the promise of § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act would have been an empty promise). But see supra notes 141-142 and accompanying
text.
146. Hughes, supra note 72, at 854; cf Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
704-06 (1979) (holding that while Title IX has a statutory procedure for terminating fund-
ing for institutions receiving federal funds if they are engaged in discriminatory practices, a
private action is "not only sensible but is also fully consistent with-and in some cases even
necessary to-the orderly enforcement of the statute").
147. Hughes, supra note 72, at 854-55; see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954); Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988).
148. No. 92-0910, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992) (mem.).
Author's note: Late in our editorial process, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's holding in Lampkin. See 27 F.3d 605 (1994).
We chose to retain this section of the Comment because the opinion of the district court,
and the analysis of that opinion contained herein, may be useful to advocates in other
jurisdictions seeking to bring a private enforcement action. Interestingly, the Court of
Appeals adopted an analysis similar to that suggested by the author here in holding that:
"[S] ection 11432(e) (3) of the McKinney Act confers enforceable rights on its beneficiaries
and that appellants may invoke section 1983 to enforce those rights." Id, at 612.
149. Lampkin, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, at *22. The court also considered an equal
protection argument challenging the school transportation assistance given handicapped
children but not the plaintiffs. Id. at *24-26. Applying the rational basis test, the court
determined that it could not end the disparate treatment in transportation assistance,
which the defendants conceded existed. Id. at *26.
150. Id. at *23.
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Act.15' In deciding the issue, the court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Suter v. Artist M.151 In Suter, the plaintiffs
attempted to bring an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pur-
suant to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.
l11
Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,154 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that the Adoption Act
did not confer "rights, privileges, or immunities" on the plaintiffs as
required under § 1983.155 Rather, the Court held that the Act merely
created a federal reimbursement program for states that incur ex-
penses in providing the services specified under the Act.156
Comparing the Adoption Act to the McKinney Act, 15 7 the
Lampkin court found that only the Secretary of Education is subject to
an enforceable obligation under the McKinney Act.158 The court
stated that "[t] he Secretary must comply with section 11434 [of the Act]
and review state plans as well as state laws, policies and practices to
assure that the states adequately address the problems of educating
homeless children before the Secretary may grant federal funds to
each state." 1 9 In turn, the court determined that the only require-
ment imposed on the state is to submit a plan or application to the
Secretary of Education. 6 ° Thus, it found that the Act does not "con-
fer an enforceable right upon plaintiffs."161
Arguably, the Lampkin court's § 1983 analysis is flawed. First,
although the Supreme Court's opinion in Suter may have had the
wide-sweeping effect advanced by the Lampkin court, it seems unlikely
that the Court intended to dismiss established precedent without so
much as a mention of the principles "formerly" recognized in § 1983
analysis. 162 Most recently, the District Court for the Southern District
151. Id. at *1-2.
152. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
153. Id. at 1364. The Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a (1988 & Supp. I).
154. Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Suter v. Artist M.,
112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
155. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1367 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479
U.S. 418, 423 (1987)).
156. Id.
157. See Lampkin v. District of Columbia, No. 92-0910, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, at
*17-20 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992) (mem.).
158. Id. at *19-20.
159. Id.
160. See id. at *18.
161. Id. at *19.
162. See Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1371 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court reaches its conclusion without even stating, much less applying, the princi-
ples our precedents have used to determine whether a statute has created a right enforcea-
ble under § 1983.").
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of Ohio insisted, in Wood v. Wallace,163 that "Suter... did not by any
means overrule [prior case law such as] Wilder [v. Hospital Assn 164]."165
As the Court recognized in Suter, the Court in Wilder v. Hospital
Association allowed a § 1983 action partly because "the statute and reg-
ulations [at issue] set forth in some detail the factors to be consid-
ered."166 In Suter, the Court identified a lack of specificity under the
Adoption Act,167 but the same is not true for the McKinney Act. Sec-
tion 11434 of the McKinney Act is very explicit as to the requirements
placed on the states,"on and these requirements have been further
clarified by the Department of Education. 69
Furthermore, the Lampkin court stated that the McKinney Act's
only requirement on states was "to submit plans or applications to be
approved by the federal government,"170 but the Act also speaks in
mandatory terms regarding achievement of its goals beyond the obli-
gation of the states to submit plans. Section 11431, which sets forth
Congress's goals, states in positive language that "each State educa-
tional agency shall assure" 71 and that "the State will review and under-
take steps"172 to achieve the breakdown of legal and procedural
barriers barring homeless children from school.1 73
Given the adequate room for contention with the Lampkin court's
reasoning, advocates should not be deterred from bringing a suit to
enforce the McKinney Act under § 1983. Additionally, advocates
163. 825 F. Supp. 177 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
164. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
165. Wood, 825 F. Supp. at 182.
166. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1368. The Court in Wilder determined that the Boren Amend-
ment to the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (13) (A), was enforceable pursuant to
§ 1983. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
167. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1369 ("What is significant is that the regulations are not specific,
and do not provide notice to the States .... ").
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 11434 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (amended 1990).
169. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, NONREGULATORY GUIDANCE (Nov. 1987).
170. Lampkin v. District of Columbia, No. 92-0910, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049, at *18
(D.D.C. June 9, 1992) (mem.).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 11431(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
172. Id. § 11431(2) (emphasis added).
173. Moreover, the legislative history states: "The purpose of [subtitle B-Education for
Homeless Children and Youth] is to make plain the intent and policy of Congress that
every child of a homeless family and each homeless youth be provided the same opportuni-
ties to receive free, appropriate educational services as children who are residents of the
state." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 460, 472; see also Non-Regulatory Guidelines-Education of Homeless Children and
Youth, in MArERmS ON EDUCATION OF HOMELESS CHILDREN 2-3 (ShelleyJackson ed. 1988)
("A homeless child may not be turned away from school prior to adoption of an overall
state plan.... [T] he obligations ... are not contingent upon adoption of the plan. States
are responsible.., for assuring that each homeless child have access to a free, appropriate
public education which would be provided to the children of residents.").
13651994]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
should lobby to encourage Congress to amend the Act to clarify that it
creates a federal right that Congress intended to be enforceable
through a private right of action and that such an action would help
effectuate the underlying purposes of the Act.
III. OTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR ADVOCATES
A. Human Rights Advocacy
International human rights advocates often find themselves with
little in the way of legislation and traditional litigation tactics to aid
them in their causes. This, however, has not stopped them from act-
ing. Professor Irwin Coder, a renowned international human rights
attorney, has laid out a four-part strategy for human rights advo-
cates, 174 which provides a useful model for homeless advocates. He
suggests: (1) creating a "mobilization of shame" against the violators
through the use of the media and published reports; 175 (2) develop-
ing "a permanent documentary record" indicating that the advocate is
"bearing witness; "176 (3) providing "solidarity-succor and assistance" to
the victims so they "know that they are not alone;" 177 and (4) "use [ing]
this advocacy as a mobilizing mechanism... for one's bar association,
government, or academic milieu." 78
Advocates for the homeless can achieve a "mobilization of shame"
in a variety of ways. First, they can write press releases or call on the
media to report the plight of their clients. Advocates can issue reports
for release to the media, local politicians, academia, other attorneys,
and others with power in the community. 179 Moreover, they can stage
protests or engage in civil disobedience to attract attention to the
problem.' 80 When engaging in this sort of activity, however, advocates
must be careful to avoid "alienat[ing] friends and foes alike" 8 1 and
174. IRWIN CoTLER, HuMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY AND THE NGO AGENDA (1989), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS (1992) (course material for International
Protection of Human Rights Seminar, Summer 1992, Human Rights Institute, Jerusalem,
Israel).
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 24.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. For example, the National Coalition for the Homeless issued such a report in 1987.
See NATIONAL COALITION, supra note 2.
180. See Woodward, supra note 116, at 287-90 (recounting the radical efforts of the Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence in attracting attention to the plight of the homeless).
181. Id. at 304.
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saturating the media to the point of societal disinterest and diversion
of attention from the reality to the drama.1 12
While the second item in Coter's plan, creation of "a permanent
documentary record," may seem part of any lawyer's duties, it may be
particularly useful in connection with advocacy for the homeless to
record anecdotal information. A good example of such recordkeep-
ing is Jonathan Kozol's Rachel and Her Children: Homeless Families in
America,' in which Kozol recorded the personal stories of a group of
homeless families living in a welfare hotel in New York City.184 Such a
detailed account of the plight of homeless families is likely not only to
attract the attention of the media and society in general, but, by invok-
ing an emotional response in many readers, also may motivate individ-
uals to become involved in remedying the situation.
Advocates may achieve Cotler's third suggestion, providing "soli-
darity-succor and assistance," by involving local community groups
such as churches and temples in the advocacy process. Religious insti-
tutions hold a "significant judicial, moral and political value,""' 5 and
enjoy a constitutionally protected religious freedom that may allow
them to participate in activities from which other groups might be
barred.'86 The moral dimension added by invoking the aid of reli-
gious institutions may, in the eyes of many, increase the weight of ar-
guments for change. As one commentator has found, "moral outcries
can lead to, and lay the groundwork for, additional legislative re-
sponses." 1"" Religious institutions such as churches and temples are
"highly respected, credible institution [s]" whose aid "adds an impecca-
ble presence and a persuasive voice .... And it is an institutional
voice that is often listened to by decision makers."'
B. Put the Power in the Hands of the People
Stephen Wexler opined that "poor people can stop poverty only
if they work at it together."8 9 Thus, advocates for the homeless "must
182. Id.
183. JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN (1988).
184. Id.; see also JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1991) (exploring the state of education for minority and socially handicapped
children).
185. Woodward, supra note 116, at 292.
186. Id. at 294. For example, in St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken, 479
A.2d 935 (N.J. 1983), a church was permitted, as an exercise of religious freedom, to oper-
ate a homeless shelter despite zoning laws prohibiting such activity in the area. Id. at 936-
37.
187. Woodward, supra note 116, at 296.
188. Id. at 297.
189. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor Peope, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970).
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put their skills to the task of helping [them] organize themselves.""' °
Solving problems for the poor on an individual basis is harmful to
their ultimate cause because it isolates them from one another and
creates a dependency on the skills of lawyers.1 91 Lawyers must recog-
nize what clients can do themselves and "teach them to do more.' 92
Wexler believed that this type of practice is beneficial for four
reasons: (1) the number of lawyers is inadequate to meet the needs of
the homeless; (2) "it is better for poor people to acquire new skills
than new dependencies"; (3) the poor will often be able to do things
"lawyers cannot or will not do"; and (4) such a practice will demystify
the law for the homeless. 193 In fact, a lawyer advocating for the home-
less might be most effective as an organizer, a teacher of rights
through both classes and written materials, and a trainer of laypersons
in the art of advocacy and confrontation. 94
C. Tell Government How to Do it Better
This strategy is a conglomeration of ways in which advocates can
tell members of the government how they should do their jobs better.
It incorporates Coder's suggestions regarding the use of detailed re-
ports and shame to motivate change,195 and includes the preparation
of critiques and recommendations, as well as scandalous reports.
One particularly extensive example of this approach is the work
of Yvonne Rafferty,' 9 6 which outlines more than twenty strategies that
policymakers could undertake to improve conditions for homeless
children.'97 Many of these strategies shift the onus of achieving edu-
cational equity for these children to current providers for the home-
less. For example, Rafferty suggests that the school districts and
shelters be held responsible for tracking the whereabouts of homeless
children.'98 Other suggestions include computerizing immunization
and placement records and creating a shared database among
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1055.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1056.
195. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
196. YVONNE RAFFERTY, AND MILES TO Go... BARRIERS TO ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND
INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE DELIVERY OF EDUCATIONAL SERVICES TO HOMELESS CHIL-
DREN (1991).
197. See generally id. at 69-150.
198. See id at 69 (proposing that district coordinators maintain a list of students); id. at
71 (proposing that shelters be visited daily by educational personnel and have preregistra-
tion services).
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schools,'9 9 faxing records between schools,2"' providing families with
information on their rights,20 ' and supplying them with fact sheets
stating the basic information necessary to register and place their chil-
dren in school.20 2 Finally, Rafferty suggests the obvious-stop bounc-
ing these families from shelter to shelter. 03
FINAL THOUGHTS
The method or remedy an advocate chooses when attacking a
problem necessarily depends greatly on the client and the client's
needs. If the client is a six-year-old child who needs a ride home from
school, the lawyer should probably not assert that great constitutional
law argument he or she has devised. A lawyer-especially a public
interest lawyer dealing with the poor-must realize that every day
their client's problem goes unresolved can be extremely detrimental.
A large company may be able to afford losing $100,000 a day for six
months without incurring devastating harm, and a personal injury vic-
tim may be able to wait two years before collecting damages, but a six-
year-old child cannot afford to lose even a day of school.
It is important to recognize that these children have already
waited too long for a remedy. Therefore, lawyers must decide which
method of advocacy will achieve the goal of getting homeless children
in school now. If possible, they should ensure the rights of other chil-
dren along the way, but if not possible, they should continue to
achieve their original goal in a timely manner. Homeless children
cannot afford to wait for them to devise a more encompassing
strategy.
In deciding upon a strategy, advocates must also weigh the value
of the input against the value of the output. For example, they should
note that litigation is a difficult road for most plaintiffs, and particu-
199. Id. at 74-75, 92.
200. Id. at 75.
201. Id. at 81.
202. Id. at 92.
203. Id.
Each school transfer represents irrevocable time lost. The cumulative effect of
these losses, even within a quality education program, contributes to academic
underachievement, holdover rates, and a loss or break in continuity of learning.
In fact, many parents indicated that transferring their children to a different
school every time they moved to a new shelter had detrimental educational conse-
quences. With each transfer, school records must be transferred, frequently re-
sulting in a delay, and transportation issues must be resolved. Parents also noted
that frequent transitions had a negative impact on their children's academic per-
formance, attendance, and attitude.
Rafferty, supra note 12, at 122.
1994] 1369
MARYLAND LAW REvIEw
larly the poor. As one commentator has urged, "litigation as a tool for
accomplishing something for poor people is an abysmal tool." °4 Cli-
ents may perpetually have to go back to court to ask for assistance in
enforcing a ruling, and many may not have the know-how or energy to
do so.2 05 In addition, the results can be inadequate, and the process
of obtaining the results may involve massive wastes of time, money,
and energy.2" 6 "Litigation is always slow, sometimes hard to fund, and
frequently an inefficient mode of accomplishing what is better
achieved by statute, regulation or vigorous social advocacy, given that
the rights of homeless children to an education somewhere are basically
noncontrovertible." 20 7
Although litigating new theories can undoubtably play an impor-
tant role in protecting the rights of the homeless, 20 8 relying on ex-
isting state statutes, organizing the homeless, lobbying in the state
legislature, and using the strategies set out by Cotler, Woodward, and
Rafferty appear to be more worthwhile. State statutory remedies have
better chances of success because they generally are not "unmarked
terrain." In such a context, "[r]ather than seeming to be leading a
vanguard regiment in a battle for a new fundamental right, plaintiffs
invoking these state law grounds appear merely to be asking for the
delivery of services and benefits the legislature has already said they
are entitled to receive. "21 While the provisions of the McKinney Act
might look promising, they are not likely to be the haven for homeless
children originally believed. Advocates can only hope that the deci-
sion in Lampkin v. District of Columbi 21° is not a promise of things to
come.
204. Hayes, supra note 102, at 1.
205. Id. at 8 (describing difficulty in enforcing a victory in litigation involving a home-
less shelter).
206. See generally id. If it is necessary to litigate, it is advisable, in light of the current
conservative trend in the federal courts, to seek remedies in state courts. See supra note 126
and accompanying text.
Simply put, the federal constitution is understood as a restraint on governmental
conduct and not as the source of an affirmative governmental duty to undertake
any action. The Constitution is, in the words ofJudge Posner, 'a charter of nega-
tive liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal
government or the state to provide services ....
Braveman, supra note 126, at 589-90 (footnotes omitted).
207. James H. Stronge & Virginia M. Helm, Legal Barriers to the Education of Homeless
Children and Youth: Residency and Guardianship Issues, 2J.L. & EDUC. 201, 216 (1991).
208. See Braveman, supra note 126, at 577 ("I concede from the start that courts cannot
solve the problems confronting poor children. Nevertheless, courts can play some role in
the overall efforts to combat poverty among children,").
209. Woodward, supra note 116, at 302.
210. No. 92-0910, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8049 (D.D.C. June 9, 1992) (mem.); see supra
note 148.
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